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The Destabilization of Pakistan
The debate is heating up between those who favor and oppose sending more troops to Afghanistan. Put me in the latter camp – I cannot support escalation without first hearing a clear explanation of the strategic changes that would accompany the escalation, along with an explanation of how we’ll address issues of government and development sector corruption. In other words, I think that pumping in more troops without addressing the structural flaws of our approach will yield no results.And since we’re a long way away from solving those problems, I think we should hold off on troop increases.
Building an argument for or against more troops involves answering a number of questions. I’m only going to deal with one sub-point here,but it’s an important one: we need to define more carefully what political and social consequences escalation in Afghanistan might have for Pakistan.
One point that everyone on all sides of the debate loves to make is that x, y, or z maneuver by the US might ‘destabilize Pakistan.’ I think we’re reaching a point where we can talk more precisely about what that means. It’s easy to talk about ‘destabilization’ – it’s a nice buzzword that makes you sound authoritative, and an intimidating prospect to scare your audience or your opponents with. It’s a bogeyman. I myself have used it that way in the past. Admittedly,’destabilization‘ can be shorthand for a range of phenomena that are understood by the parties involved in a debate, but I think in this case we need to bring our use of the word back to more concrete details. The debate about Afghanistan/Pakistan needs to be accessible to as many Americans as possible.
Pakistan Politics on the Brink Again:
By Shuja Nawaz
August 19th, 2008
As Pakistan lurches into another paroxysm of power politics with the threatened impeachment and expected resignation of President Pervez Musharraf, the post-Musharraf picture is not as clear or rosy as the authors of this move may want it to be. The unelected leaders of the coalition government of the Pakistan Peoples’ Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (N), Messrs. Asif Ali Zardari and M. Nawaz Sharif respectively may yet find themselves facing a political mess even after Musharraf is gone. There is much that may yet split their on-again, off-again alliance and bring the country to the edge of a new political crisis. In the meantime, the country is sliding into economic chaos and there is no sign that the government has a credible strategy to cope with the impending disaster.
After two weeks of travel and conversations with citizens, civil leaders, military officials, and journalists in Pakistan, a complex picture emerges: a country beset by serious economic woes, a growing insurgency, and a fractured polity. In the shadows sits the powerful Pakistan army, the historical arbiter of Pakistani politics, headed by a publicly inscrutable but privately engaged and engaging new chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.
Moakhza
Table Talk
Ousting Zardari
July 16th, 2008 · Shaan Akbar
Insider Brief sources report that Pakistani intelligence officials have recently been engaged in a spate of closed-door meetings. The topic of discussion? The ouster of Asif Ali Zardari and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) from power and the engineered return of Nawaz Sharif.
The Why
The news in and of itself should not be surprising, and for multiple reasons. First, the Pakistani military/intelligence establishment has always distrusted and disliked the PPP. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir’s father, recognized this and established the Federal Security Force in an attempt to offset the influence of the ISI. The FSF was promptly disbanded after Gen. Zia-ul-Huq’s 1979 coup. On the other hand, Nawaz Sharif is a child of the establishment, promoted and sponsored by Gen. Zia himself.
Pakistan remains in a leaderless drift four months after elections, Western diplomats and military officials have said, and Pakistani politicians and Afghan officials are increasingly worried that no one is really in charge.
The leadership vacuum is most stark in dealing with militants, Pakistani politicians and foreign diplomats have said, adding that the Pakistani government and military officials were sending mixed signals about policy in the tribal areas that have become home to the Taliban and to Al Qaeda.
That confusion, military officials and diplomats warn, is allowing the militants to consolidate their sanctuaries while spreading their tentacles all along the border area. It has also complicated policy for the administration of George W. Bush, which leaned heavily on one man, President Pervez Musharraf, to streamline its anti-terrorism efforts in Paksitan.
If anyone is in charge, Pakistani politicians and Western diplomats say, it remains the military and the country’s premier intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, which operate with little real oversight.
While the recently elected civilian government has been criticized for dealing with militants, the military is brokering cease-fires and prisoner exchanges with minimum consultation with the government, politicians from the government coalition, diplomats and analysts said. Meanwhile, politicians in both the provincial and central government complain that they are excluded from the negotiations and did not even know of a secret deal struck in February, before the elections, let alone the details of the accord.
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